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INTRODUCTION
On Monday, October 1, 2001, the Supreme Court's Term began
with the arguments in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.' In Malesko,
a prisoner argued that he should have a Bivens cause of action for the
violation of his constitutional rights against a private correctional fa-
cility that contracted with the federal government's Bureau of Pris-
ons. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
handed down on November 27, 2001, the Supreme Court refused to
allow the prisoner to bring a constitutional cause of action against the
private contractor engaging in federal action.
The Malesko opinion is of interest in part because the privatization
of prisons has incited controversy over whether private institutions
should fulfill roles traditionally performed by the state or federal
government. The restrictions on parole, three-strikes-and-you're-out
legislation, and mandatory minimum sentences have kept prisons at
or above maximum capacity.2 As a result of the demand for prison
space, the private correctional industry has experienced dramatic
3growth. The nation's privatized prisons now generate revenue in ex-
cess of one billion dollars a year.
The attempts to "farm out" prisons has fostered a heated debate
between proponents and opponents of privatization. Proponents
contend that private contractors deliver goods more efficiently than
government workers and that contractors exert beneficial competitive
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1122 S. Ct. 515 (2001).
2 SeeSuzanne Smalley, A Stir over Private Pens, NAT'LJ., May 1, 1999, at 1168, 1169 (reporting
that tough-on-crime laws have contributed to 1.8 million people being incarcerated in the
United States as of 1998, more than double the prison population in 1985).
See id. at 1169 (citing an increase in private prison beds from 44,000 in 1996 to 121,000 in
1999 and an increase of revenues from $650 million in 1996 to more than $1 billion in 1997).
4 Id at 1169.
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pressures on government,5 citing anywhere from a two to twenty-eight
percent savings over govemment-run facilities.6 Opponents of priva-
tization point to violations of constitutional rights in private facilities.
For example, at the Corrections Corporation of America facility in
Youngstown, Ohio, inmates received a $1.65 million settlement for
inadequate medical care and abuses by private corrections officers.7
In fact, petitioners in Malesko, Correctional Services Corporation, had
previously been known as Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., which
ran an Immigration and Naturalization Service detention center in
Elizabeth, NewJersey. The INS closed that facility in June of 1995 af-
ter aliens held there rioted to protest the corporation's "abus[ive]
and inhumane treatment."
8
Malesko is also of note because it indicates a refusal by the Court to
imply the constitutional cause of action against anyone but federal
officers. Traditionally, the Bivens cause of action has only been avail-
able to plaintiffs seeking damages from individual officers.9 However,
the circuit courts had split on the issue, with the D.C. Circuit ° pre-
cluding plaintiffs from suing private corporations under Bivens and
the Second" and Sixth 12 Circuits allowing the suits. The possibility
that private corporate entities might be held liable had weighty im-
plications, given that private contractors, not just private prisons,
would have generally been liable under the Second and Sixth Cir-
cuits' analyses. This might have resulted in private contractors being
held responsible for enormous damage liability-liability that gov-
ernments often avoided under the guise of sovereign immunity or
5 SeeJack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share the Sov-
ereign's Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 175, 181-82 (1997) (presenting
strengths and weaknesses of the privatization of government services).
6 See Smalley, supra note 2, at 1170 (citing a study by the Reason Public Policy Institute, but
also noting a survey commissioned by the Justice Department that found that the most detailed
studies indicated the smallest cost savings from privatization).
7 Id. at 1168 (recounting settlement of class action lawsuit brought by inmates against the
Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, a private prison owned by the Corrections Corporation of
America).
8 78 No. 47 Interpreter Releases 1849, 1849 (Dec. 10, 2001).
9 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971) ("In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), we reserved the question whether violation of that
command by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action
for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct. Today we hold that it does.").
10 See Kauffman v. Anglo-American Sch. of Sofia, 28 F.3d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that
former employees could not sue under Bivens a school originally established by the State De-
partment because it was not a state actor).
1 See Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.d 374 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a private
prison corporation could be sued under Bivens for the violations of an inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights).
12 See Hammons v. Norfolk S. Corp., 156 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a railway
company could be sued under Bivens for the violation of an employee's Fourth Amendment
rights).
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punitive damages case law.'3 However, the Court has precluded liabil-
ity of federal contractors under a Bivens cause of action and held that
state law causes of action are sufficient to vindicate plaintiffs' griev-
ances, be they of a constitutional nature or not.
Part I of this Case Note will explain the traditional liability of fed-
eral agents under Bivens and its progeny. Part II will outline the split
between the circuits. Part III will discuss the Malesko Court's rationale
and offer analysis of that rationale. Part IV will argue that private
corporations should be subject to Bivens claims, following the tradi-
tional approach to liability that provides for parallel state and federal
causes of action for violations of constitutional rights. Finally, Part V
concludes that as the parallel cause of action against state actors"
would allow for the liability of contractors for prison services, so, too,
should the cause of action against federal actors.
I. LIABILITY UNDER B1vENs
A. The Court Holds the Federal Constitution Provides a Free-Standing Cause
of Action, Regardless of State Law Causes of Action
The landmark case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics5 promised the vindication of constitutional rights
through the federal courts. Webster Bivens alleged the warrantless
search of his apartment and his subsequent arrest by federal agents
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures. 6 As all charges against Bivens were dropped,
he could not seek recourse by moving to exclude evidence in a
criminal trial or requesting an injunction against future intrusions.
7
The district court dismissed Bivens' suit for money damages against
the federal agents who effectuated the search and arrest for failure to
state a cause of action. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed.18
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, acknowledged that al-
though the Fourth Amendment does not provide for an award of
money damages, the federal courts can use any available remedy
where legal rights have been invaded and a statute provides for a
general right to sue.' 9 Essentially, Brennan concluded that a cause of
13 See infra Part IV.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
15 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
16 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
17 Id. at 410 (Harlan,J., concurring) ("[A]ssuming Bivens' innocence of the crime charged,
the 'exclusionary rule' is simply irrelevant.").
18 Id. at 390.
19 Id. at 396.
[Vol. 4.4
BIVENS LTABITY OFFRDERAL CONTRACTORS
action against federal agents in their personal capacities may be in-
ferred from the Constitution,20 despite the lack of explicit statutory
authorization.2' A remedy is to be inferred unless "special factors
counselling hesitation" exist or where there is an equally effective
remedy provided by Congress.2 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence,
argued that the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, granted
the courts the jurisdiction and therefore the power to grant relief.2
Harlan argued that the "power to award damages obviously exists,
since the Court awards damages in statutory cases, and that if the
Court can effectuate statutory rights, it can certainly effectuate consti-
tutional rights," which are meant to control the majoritarian nature
of democracy.2
The need for a Bivens remedy is compelling. Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion raised a stark reality: "[S] ome form of damages is
the only possible remedy for someone in Bivens' alleged position. It
will be a rare case indeed in which an individual in Bivens' position
will be able to obviate the harm by securing injunctive relief from any
court."2 For plaintiffs like Bivens-against whom the criminal
charges had been dropped-there will be no other recourse. The Bi-
vens remedy is seen as important precisely because "it is damages or
nothing."
26
In addition, a federal government agent's violation of a citizen's
constitutional rights is particularly troubling. Professor Schuck notes:
As the Supreme Court observed in Bivens. "An agent acting-albeit un-
constitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater
capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority
2D The Court has elsewhere explained the distinction between suits against officials in their
personal and official capacities:
Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for
actions he takes under color of state law. Official capacity suits, in contrast, "generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is
an agent" .... Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capac-
ity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to re-
cover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government
entity itself.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citations omitted).
21 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
The Bivens Court held:
The present case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of af-
firmative action by Congress .... For we have here no explicit congressional declaration
that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not
recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another rem-
edy, equally effective in the view of Congress.
Id at 396-97.
23 i at 405 (Harlan,J. concurring).
24 Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CALL. REV. 289,
296 (1995).
5 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409-10 (Harlan,J., concurring).
6 Id. at 410.
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other than his own." When officials err or misbehave, theyrisk grievous
injury to individuals and to the integrity of public authority.
The implications of Bivens in addressing these violations are weighty:
Bivens contained two crucial insights in the realm of constitutional en-
forcement. It recognized that the judicial branch can enforce the Consti-
tution without congressional action. It also recognized that the Constitu-
tion should be enforceable on its own terms, not because of its
congruence with state law or common law protections. That is, a federal
cause of action should be available for federal constitutional violations.2
But Bivens is perhaps most striking because of its holding that vio-
lations of the Federal Constitution are punishable in and of themselves,
regardless of the availability of state law causes of action. Indeed, Jus-
tice Brennan specifically rejected the Department of Justice's argu-
ment that Bivens could obtain damages only in state court.2 He
noted: "Our cases have long since rejected the notion that the
Fourth Amendment proscribes only such conduct as would, if en-
gaged in by private persons, be condemned by state law."0 The Su-
preme Court had already held that the Fourth Amendment is nottied to31
tied to local trespass laws. In fact, state laws might be hostile to the
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, in spite of state law causes of ac-
tion, the Court found a free-standing cause of action for the violation
of rights ensured by the Federal Constitution.
In the years since the opinion was issued, Bivens has gained schol-
arly support.33 Granted, eminent scholars have argued that limiting
damages for violations of constitutional rights fosters the develop-
ment of constitutional rights, by shifting the focus from reparation to
reform 4 Those same scholars recognize, however, that the proposi-
tion that governments acting unconstitutionally must make their vic-
tims whole has gained nearly universal assent.3
27 PERH. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 64 (1983) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392).
23 Bandes, supra note 24, at 291.
2 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390.
30 1d. at 392.
31 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394.
33 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1822 (1991) (praising the Court's decision to hold indi-
vidual officers liable for constitutional violations as genius).
M See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 102
(1999) (arguing that Brown would never have been decided if school districts had been subject
to money damages and that constitutional rights would have stagnated).
35 See id. at 101-02.
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B. Bivens' Progeny
In the years following Bivens, the Court took first an expansive ap-
proach to the cause of action, but then narrowed its availability.
Davis v. Passman was a Bivens action brought by a former employee
against Congressman Otto Passman; the employee alleged she was
fired because of her sex, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal
protection component. The Court, per Justice Brennan, held that a
Bivens remedy was available to Ms. Davis. Although he acknowledged
that many rights are enforced through statutory schemes, he rejected
the notion that Congress must identify appropriate constitutional
causes of action: "The Constitution, on the other hand, does not
'partake of the prolixity of the legal code' .... And in 'its great out-
lines,' the judiciary is clearly discernable as the primary means
through which these rights may be enforced."37 Justice Powell's dis-
sent stressed that when the judiciary is asked to infer a private right of
action directly from the Constitution it should exercise "principled
discretion."33 The factors Powell lists as weighing against granting a
Bivens cause of action in this case, however, seem to turn on his ob-
jection to a congressman being held liable under Bivens. He cited the
congressman's need to rely on his staff and the Tite VII mandate that
federal employees resort only to that cause of action for remedies.
In Carlson v. Green,39 the Court again found a Bivens remedy where
a prisoner had been denied medical treatment, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The
remedy was only unavailable where either the defendant could show
"special factors counselling hesitation," or that "Congress has pro-
vided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substi-
tute for recovery under the Constitution and viewed as equally effec-
tive." 4 The Court found no "special factors counselling hesitation"
and despite the availability of relief under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the Court granted the cause of action. The FTCA was held not
to meet the equally effective alternative requirement because there
was no indication in the legislative text or history to suggest that
Congress intended the FTCA to constitute a substitute remedy. In-
terestingly, the Court seemed to apply a clear statement rule mimick-
ing that of later cases such as Atascaderol and Tafflin.4 Although Jus-
36 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
37 Davis, 442 U.S. at 241 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407
(1819)).
Id at 254 (PoweIl,J., dissenting).
S9 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
40 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19.
41 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (requiring a clear statement of
congressional intent where a statute seeks to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
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tice Powell criticized the Court for in effect instituting the new clear
statement rule, he agreed that the FTCA was not an adequate alterna-
tive remedy and concurred with the majority.43
After the strongly pro-plaintiff opinions of Davis and Carlson, the
Court, on several occasions, has refused to imply a Bivens remedy.
Several of these cases were based on the provision of alternative con-
gressional remedies. Justice Stevens authored the opinion in Bush v.
Lucas,44 which held that a federal employee did not have a Bivens
cause of action for a violation of his First Amendment rights. The
elaborate remedial system, the Civil Service Commission's Appeals
Review Board, had already reinstated the plaintiff, Mr. Bush, and had
awarded him backpay. Although the Court found the remedial sys-
tem was not on par with the Bivens remedy because it did not provide
for emotional and dignitary harms, it held that the system was not to
be augmented by a Bivens remedy. "[W]e decline 'to create a new
substantive legal liability without legislative aid and as at the common
law' ... because we are convinced that Congress is in a better posi-
tion to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by
creating it."'4
C. Federal Agencies Are Deemed Not Liable Under Bivens
A 1994 Supreme Court decision also limited the scope of Bivens
remedies by refusing to hold federal agencies liable for violations of
constitutional rights. In FDIC v. Meyer, an employee of a failed savings
and loan brought a Bivens action against the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (later taken over by the FDIC) alleging
that his termination violated his Fifth Amendment procedural due
process rights.4 Although a federal agency would usually be pro-
tected from suit by sovereign immunity, Congress had waived the
FDIC's sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the liability of federal agencies would impose a poten-
tially enormous drain on the public Treasury and, therefore, consti-
tuted a special factor counselling hesitation.47  Most importantly,
Justice Thomas reasoned, Bivens was based on the concession that the
federal government itself was immune from suit. s Justice Thomas
42 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating a clear statement
where Congress wishes to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts).
43 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 25-30 (Powell,J., concurring).
44 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
45 Bush, 462 U.S. at 390 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 302
(1947)).
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 474 (1994).
47 Id- at 486.
48 See id. at 485.
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drew from Harlan's concurrence in Bivens: "However desirable a di-
rect remedy against the Government might be as a substitute for indi-
vidual official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to suit."49
Justice Thomas noted that "[iln essence, Meyer asks us to imply a
damages action based on a decision that presumed the absence of that
very action."5°
The Court also reasoned that if federal agencies were held liable,
plaintiffs could circumvent federal agents' qualified immunity de-
fense,51 which would eviscerate the Bivens remedy. 2 Justice Thomas
further argued that the purpose of the Bivens remedy is to deter the
officer. If the qualified immunity defense can be avoided by suing
the agency as opposed to the officer, however, officers would no
longer be subject to suit and "the deterrent effects of the Bivens rem-
edy would be lost."53 Finally, considering the implication of an enor-
mous financial burden for the federal government, the court refused
to hold agencies liable without congressional legislation.
The Meyer rationale as to federal agencies does not come close to
implying that a Bivens claim should not exist against a private corpo-
ration engaged in state action. First, the liability of a private corpora-
tion that has contracted with the state would not impose a drain on
the public Treasury. Second, a direct remedy against a private corpo-
ration cannot be said to constitute a suit against the government,
whereas if an agency established by the federal government is sued,
the sovereign is, in essence, being haled into court. In addition, al-
though some might argue that plaintiffs will sue the corporation to
avoid suing the employee and therefore decrease the deterrence
value of the traditional Bivens remedy, a suit against a corporation
might well provide more deterrence than a suit against an employee,
who is himself two steps from 'judgment proof' status. The need for
deterrence of the officer in the traditional Bivens realm results pre-
cisely from the sovereign's immunity. Because the sovereign has no
impetus to deter the officer from unconstitutional acts, but citizens
retain the protections of the Constitution, the Court has created a
remedy which forces the employee to check his own actions. Where
the employer is not immune, the employee can be deterred both by
his own fear of suit and, perhaps more effectively, by the training and
disciplinary procedures provided by an employer seeking to avoid
9 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan,J., concurring).
W Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485.
51 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (holding that an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed the act complained of was lawful
in light of clearly established law at the time of the alleged violation).
5- Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485.
53Id
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suit. Finally, as there is no implication of an enormous drain on the
Federal Treasury, the Court is not circumscribed by Meyers require-
ment that it await congressional legislation.
Despite the Supreme Court's refusal in Meyer to subject federal
agencies to Bivens liability, the growth of the private prison industry-
and the general increase in privatization of government functions-
raised the possibility of an expansion of Bivens defendants to include
private corporations.M If governmental functions are increasingly
handled by private corporations, the possibility that those corpora-
tions might violate citizens' constitutional rights increases, as does the
need for damage actions against those corporations. If the split in
the circuits had been resolved so that private corporations were li-
able, the Bivens cause of action would have mirrored the § 1983 cause
of action more closely than it does now under Malesko.
II. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
Prior to Meyer, "no circuit court ever held that private entities were
not subject to Bivens claims. ' ' 5 The Ninth Circuit held that a private
corporation employed by the Department of the Navy to provide se-
curity services would be liable under Bivens if it engaged in federal ac-
tion. The First Circuit acknowledged that private entities may be
subject to Bivens claims but refused to hold that a legal assistance
corporation engaged in federal action.57 In other words, the First
Circuit in Gerena accepted that a Bivens action could be maintained
against a private corporation, but refused to find that Puerto Rico
Legal Services had acted under the guise of the federal government,
as required by the state action doctrine!i Likewise, in Dobyns v. E-
Systems, Inc.,59 a Bivens claim was allowed to stand against a private
contractor that supplied personnel, materials, transportation and
services to the federal government.
Despite the fact that no court before Meyer ever precluded a Bivens
suit against a private corporation and that MV/eyer itself only addresses
the issue of federal agency liability and never reaches the liability of
private corporations, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held
that Meyer prohibits Bivens claims against private corporations acting
under color of federal law.6°
M See Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Second Circuit Review: Government Contract Liabil-
ity, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 25, 2000, at 3.
Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2000).
See Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987).
57 See Gerena v. P.R. Legal Servs., Inc., 697 F.2d 447 (1st Cir. 1983).
5 See id. See also infra Part IV.E.
59 Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 667 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1982).
60 See Kauffman v. Anglo-American Sch. of Sofia, 28 F.3d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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A. The Kauffman Court Precludes Bivens Claims Against Private
Corporations Acting Under Color of Federal Law
In 1994, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the Bivens claims against the
Anglo-American School of Sofia brought by former employees. 61 The
school was initially established in 1967 by the U.S. Department of
State to provide schooling for the children of American and British
diplomats residing in Sofia, Bulgaria. Although the school's
amended charter characterized the school as a private and inde-
pendent organization, the American and British ambassadors to Bul-
garia each appointed three members to the school's seven member
governing board. Those members, appointed by the American am-
bassador, were employees of the United States Department of State.
In addition, the school received part of its funding from the State
Department. Park Dean Kauffman, the director of the school, and
Gaila Kauffman, a staff teacher, had contracted to work for the school
untilJune 15, 1991, but Mr. Kauffman was fired in June of 1989. The
Kauffmans' amended complaint alleged that the "[s]chool is con-
trolled by the U.S. Government" and by firing Mr. Kauffman, it vio-
lated his First and Fifth Amendment rights.62
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that in order for a Bivens action to
lie against the school, the school must be considered a federal actor:
Even if the school is a federal actor, however, it is not a federal agency: it
is plainly a different sort of entity than the FSLIC, the agency at issue in
Ayer. Still, the differences between a federal agency and an artificial
person that is a federal actor seem to weaken, rather than strengthen, the
case for a Bivens remedy.
6
3
According to Judge Williams, "the Kauffmans enjoy a constitutional
claim only to the extent that the School's decision to terminate Mr.
Kauffman's employment can be analogized to the decision of a fed-
eral agency."64 The court admitted the circuit had once allowed a Bi-
vens action to be brought against a private corporation whose agents
had taken actions at the behest of, and in conjunction with, the fed-
eral government.65 However, the court held that the Reuber analysis
could not survive Meyer6 Reubers guiding principle was that "when a
defendant is sufficiently connected to the government that his acts
are subject to constitutional constraints, the availability of the Bivens
remedy should not turn on the defendant's nominal status as 'pri-
61 See id.
6 Id. at 1225.
6 Id. at 1226.
Id.
See id. (citing Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
66 See Kauffman, 28 F.3d at 1226-27.
Mlay 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
vate' or 'public."' 67 The court contended that its decision that the
school could not be subject to a Bivens claim "affords the Kauffmans
precisely the same Bivens remedies that they would have if the School
were really a federal agency ..."38
The majority conceded the Meyer argument that the deterrent
purpose of Bivens would be undermined in actions against private
parties held little weight in the instant case since the circuit court had
afforded private entities the same qualified immunity their agents re-
ceived.6 Nevertheless, the court stressed the Meyer "premise" that in-
dividual agents are not deterred by the possibility of suit against their
employers and utilized the decrease in deterrence of individual
agents to preclude suit against private agencies.70 In addition, the
D.C. Circuit cited the Meyer concern that "the potentially large finan-
cial drain on the government constituted a 'special factor[] counsel-
ling hesitation' against the judicial creation" of the proposed dam-
ages remedy.71  If the school-which was created to serve the
governmental interest of providing diplomats' children with an edu-
cation and is partially funded by the government-were held liable,
the government would have to choose between allowing its interests
to suffer from decreased funding or being forced to make up the dif-
ference created by the liability. The court stated: "[D]iversion of
resources from a private entity created to advance federal interests
has effects similar to those of diversion of resources directly from the
Treasury. ' 73 In addition, the Kauffman court cited the Supreme
Court's reluctance to expand the availability of the Bivens remedy
noted in both Meyer and in Schweiker v. Chilicky.74
The D.C. Circuit's final analysis seemingly glossed over the well-
established doctrine of state action, which allows suits under the Con-
stitution only against the State and individuals who have acted under
the auspices of the State.n The court found "it is axiomatic that a Bi-
vens action can be brought only against one who is engaged in gov-
ernmental... action .... The Kauffman court offered no analysis
Id- at 1226-27.
6 Id. at 1227.
69 See Reuber, 750 F.2d at 1057 n.25; Kauffman, 28 F.3d at 1063-64 (BorkJ., concurring).
7 Kauffman, 28 F.3d at 1227.
71 Id at 1227.
72 See id.
73 Id. at 1227-28.
74 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (holding that an intricate remedial scheme for lost Social Security
benefits constituted a special factor counseling hesitation and precluded Bivens claims against
Social Security administrators).
Z See infra Part III.C.
76 Kauffman, 28 F.3d at 1228 (citing Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1054 (D.C. Cir.
1984)).
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of why the Supreme Court has held private individuals liable where
they have engaged in state action.
Chief Judge Mikva dissented in Kauffman, citing circuit precedent
that allowed plaintiffs to bring Bivens actions against private state ac-
tors.7 Mikva objected to the overruling of Reuber and argued that
Reuber in fact furthered the purposes of Bivens by providing "a dam-
ages remedy to those aggrieved by unconstitutional actions."7 Reuber
rested on the Bivens proposition that the Constitution implies a dam-
ages remedy, to which the courts must defer, unless Congress has
provided an equally effective remedy or there are special circum-
stances counseling hesitation.9 Unless Meyer "tacitly overruled or fa-
tally undermined" the cases supporting liability of private state actors,
the circuit had no authority to overrule Reuber.80 Instead, Meyer only
ruled on the liability of federal agencies for constitutional violations
and made no reference to private actors engaged in federal action.8
"In Meyer, the Supreme Court emphatically noted the complete ab-
sence of circuit court precedent for applying Bivens to a federal
agency; indeed, the Court based its decision in large part on the nov-
elty of such a remedy." 2 Whereas Meyer did not require the Supreme
Court to overrule numerous circuits, the Kauffman majority overruled
itself and disregarded the precedent of several other circuits.
8
3
Moreover, the differences between suits against federal agencies and
those against private actors engaged in federal action counsel against
barring Bivens actions against private actors. The Meyer court particu-
larly stressed that the deterrent effect of Bivens would be undermined
if suits were allowed against federal agencies and plaintiffs could
avoid the qualified immunity defense asserted by individual officials.
84
Chief Judge Mikva questioned whether that deterrence rationale
could be extended to cases involving private entities and reasoned
that it was far less compelling, as the Reuber court had extended the
same qualified immunity to the private entity as its employees en-
joyed.&
7 Id. at 1229 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting) (citing Reuber, 750 F.2d at 1039).
78 Id. at 1229 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting).
7aId"
See id. at 1230 (citing Brewster v. Commissioner, 607 F.2d 1369, 1373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
which explained that "future panels are bound to follow precedent set by previous panels until
the en banc court or Supreme Court overrules that precedent").
81 SeeFDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
Kauffnain, 28 F.3d at 1230 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting).
83 Id. at 1229-30.
&4 Id. at 1230.
5 Id. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the extension of qualified immunity to
employees of private corporations that contract with the government. See Richardson v.
McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (holding that private prison guards do not enjoy the qualified
immunity of their state employed counterparts).
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The Chief Judge also disagreed that Meyer implied that any weak-
ening of the deterrent effect would be sufficient to deny a Bivens
remedy.• In addition, although the Meyer majority cited the burden
on the Federal Treasury as rationale for its refusal to hold federal
agencies liable, those same concerns do not apply equally to private
entitles. Mikva explained: "Private state actors often are govern-
ment-controlled only for a limited purpose, so there is no reason to
think the losses would come out of the Federal Treasury in the ordi-
nary case." S8 Because the government rarely indemnifies private con-
tractors and money damages therefore would not be coming from
the Federal Treasury, the Bivens action should be allowed.
B. The Hammons Court Holds That Bivens Actions Do Lie Against Private
Contractors Engaged in Federal Action
The Sixth Circuit refused to follow the D.C. Circuit and find that
Meyer precludes Bivens actions against private corporations that en-
gage in state action. In Hammons v. Norfolk Southern Corp.,89 the de-
fendant corporation tested the plaintiff for illegal drugs, pursuant to
the company's policy and a mandate by the Federal Railroad Admini-
stration's Control of Alcohol and Drug Use Regulations."° The plain-
tiff tested positive for marijuana and was placed on probation.9' A
year and a half later he tested positive for cocaine and was termi-
nated. Hammons filed an action against his former employer claim-
ing the company violated his "Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures."92 The court of appeals assumed,
in order to reach the issue of whether a private entity could be sued
under Bivens, that sufficient federal action had been alleged. 93 The
Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's holding that Meyer proved
dispositive on the issue of private Bivens liability and reasoned that
the Supreme Court's rationale for precluding Bivens actions against
federal agencies does not apply to private corporations. Judge Clay
acknowledged the deterrence rationale cited by Justice Thomas in
Meyer, but recounted the various policy goals underlying the Bivens
decision, including the history of the federal courts and their role in
86 Kauffman, 28 F.3d at 1230-31.
87 Id. at 1231.
88Id.
89 156 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1998).
90 Id. at 702.
9' Id.
92 Id. at 703.
93 The court noted, however, that it passed "no judgment as to whether federal action is in-
volved in the instant case." Id. at 705 n.8.
94 Id at 705.
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securing constitutional rights.5 "[W]here federally protected rights
have been invaded, it has been the role from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the neces-
sary relief." 9 Judge Clay also pointed to the Bivens Court's citation of
the traditional availability of damages for the invasion of a personal
interest in liberty, and the idea expressed in Marbury v. Madison, and
noted in Bivens, that "[t] he very essence of civil liberty certainly con-
sists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury."
97
After citing the several goals of the Bivens Court, the Sixth Circuit
elected to grant greater weight to what it considered the "primary
goal" of Bivens:. "[T] o provide a remedy for victims of constitutional
violations by federal agents where no other remedy exists, regardless
of whether the official would be deterred in the future from engaging
in such conduct."9 The court acknowledged the benefit of deterring
the individual wrongdoer, but invoked Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Bivens, in which he opined that even if there were no deterrent ef-
fect on individual officers, the plaintiff should be entitled to dam-
99
ages.
The Sixth Circuit also refused to apply the Meyer rationale for pre-
venting Bivens claims against federal agencies-the potentially large
fiscal burden on the Treasury-to situations involving private corpo-
rations.' °° Where the federal purse is not involved, defendants cannot
claim that the preclusion of a remedy is necessary to prevent a strain
on the Treasury.
Finally, the Hammons court analogized the liability of private cor-
porations under § 1983 to their proposed liability under Bivens. As
actions brought under Bivens and § 1983 raise the identical concerns
of vindicating rights secured by the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has granted the same immunity to federal officials from Bivens actions
as that granted to state officials from § 1983 actions.' O' As a general
matter, § 1983 standards of liability parallel Bivens standards of liabil-
ity.'02 Since it is well established that corporations which engage in
9Id.
See id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (internal citation omitted)).
See Hammons, 156 F.3d at 706 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803))).
9 Hammons, 156 F.3d at 706.
99 See id. at 706 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
19O See Hammons, 156 F.3d at 706 ("Allowing a Bivens claim against a private corporation does
not implicate 'federal fiscal policy' .... ").
101 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (holding that federal officials are only entitled
to the absolute or qualified immunity that state officials receive under § 1983).
10 See infra Part IV.
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state action can be sued under § 1983,03 Judge Clay could find no
valid reason to preclude the liability of corporations engaged in fed-
eral action from Bivens suits in the Hammons case. From a victim's
perspective, there is no effective difference between whether one's
rights are violated by a municipal officer, a federal agent, or the em-
ployee of a private corporation completing the tasks required by a
government contract. The liability should therefore be the same for
each official. 1°4
1. District Court Subsequently Restricts Hammons'
"Under Color of Federal Law"
One district court offered a more narrow definition of Hammons'
construction of action under color of federal law. In Yeager v. General
Motors Corp.,105 a white male applicant who was not selected for an ap-
prenticeship program with General Motors ("GM") alleged that the
company's affirmative action program violated his Tite VII and Fifth
Amendment rights.' °6 The district court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the issue of a Fifth Amendment viola-
tion, holding that GM's actions did not constitute action under color
of federal law. 07 GM initially established its affirmative action pro-
gram in response to a conciliation agreement with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, but the agreement lagsed in
1988, prior to the events of which the plaintiff complained. Since
GM extended the affirmative action program after its termination in
compliance with Executive Order 11246, which requires government
contractors to establish affirmative action programs, the plaintiff ar-
gued that defendant was acting under color of federal law. The
plaintiff cited Hammons as weight that regulations which force a cor-
poration to act in an enforcement capacity for the federal govern-
ment confer federal action.' °9 The district court, however, differenti-
ated the Hammons regulations, which forced the corporation to test
its employees for drug use, and GM's affirmative action program:
"[T]he Executive Order upon which GM's plan is premised is to be
103 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding private creditor liable for
the use of a state court attachment proceeding that violated debtor's Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process).
104 This analysis does not square with that of Richardson v. McKnigh 521 U.S. 399 (1997),
where the Court held that private prison guards are not entitled to the qualified immunity that
public officers receive. See infra Part IV.D.
105 67 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
10 Id at 798.
107 Id. at 803.
108 Id. at 802.
109 Id.
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complied with voluntarily."110 As it was unnecessary for GM to con-
tract with the federal government, it was free to choose whether to
implement the affirmative action program. i Since GM was not
forced to comply with a government mandate, it was not acting under
color of federal law and its Fifth Amendment claim failed.
C. The Second Circuit Opinion That Private Corporations
Are Liable Under Bivens
The Second Circuit weighed in on the issue of private contractor
liability in Bivens actions and issued the opinion that was reversed bythe upr me our  In• .112
the Supreme Court. In Malesko v. Correctional Services Corp., Judge
Sotomayor, joined by Judge Pooler, ruled that a private prison corpo-S 113
ration acting under color of federal law was liable under Bivens. In
1992, John Malesko was convicted of federal securities fraud and sen-
tenced to eighteen months imprisonment. During his incarceration,
Malesko was diagnosed with a heart condition and prescribed medi-
cation.1 4 He was subsequently transferred to a halfway house, which
was operated on behalf of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") by Correc-
tional Services Corporation ("CSC"), a private corporation that con-
tracted with BOP. A CSC policy at the halfway house prohibited in-
mates from using the elevator unless they lived on the sixth floor or
above.1 Nevertheless, Malesko claimed, CSC staff allowed him to use
the elevator because they were aware of his heart condition. On
March 28, 1994, a CSC employee, Jorge Urena, prevented Malesko
from using the elevator to reach his fifth-floor room, despite Male-
sko's objection that his condition made using the stairs dangerous.
While climbing the stairs, Malesko suffered a heart attack, fell, and
injured himself."6 In addition, Malesko claimed that CSC had failed
to provide him with medication once his supply had run out.117 Male-
sko brought a Bivens action against both CSC and Urena. The claim
against Urena was ultimately dismissed as time-barred,"8 but the claim
against CSC, however, raised an issue of first impression in the Sec-
ond Circuit.19
110 See id. (citing McLaughlin v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 495 F. Supp. 857 (N.D.
Ohio 1980), as support for holding that defendant's implementation of plan to comply with
Executive Order 11246 was voluntary).
III See Yeager, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
11 229 F.3d 374 (2d.Cir. 2000).
"1 Id. 229 F.3d at 377-78.
1 Id. at 376.
11 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 384.
"1 Id. at 377.
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The district court had reasoned that FDIC v. Meyer precluded a Bi-
vens claim against anyone but an individual.' 2° Judge Sotomayor re-
jected that interpretation of Meyer. 12 Instead, she reiterated the ra-
tionale of Meyer first, part of the Bivens rationale for the liability of
individual agents was to compensate for a lack of direct action against
the government; second, sanctioning suits against agencies would
undermine the deterrent effect of the Bivens remedy; and, finally, to
put an enormous financial burden on the government required con-
gressional legislation.22 Judge Sotomayor recounted the Kauffman
reasoning: "Because a private entity must act under color of federal
law in order to be subject to Bivens, such an entity is 'equivalent' to a
federal agency and, under Meyer, must be treated as 'if [it] were really
a federal agency. ' '' 23 The Malesko court held, however, that Meyer was
not dispositive because private entities acting on behalf of the federal
government are not the equivalent of federal agencies.' The Second
Circuit had already determined that Blue Cross, in processing Medi-
care claims, had acted as an agent of the federal government, not as a
federal agency1ss Judge Sotomayor found no reason to treat CSC dif-
ferently than other private corporations acting on behalf of the fed-
eral government.
6
Judge Sotomayor acknowledged the Kauffman majority's concern
that employees of private entities would not be deterred from uncon-
stitutional conduct because the entities would be sued. Nevertheless,
she found the availability of Bivens liability warranted, notwithstand-
ing the lack of a substantial deterrent effect, in an effort to accom-
plish the more important Bivens goal of providing a remedy for con-
stitutional violations.'2 The court acknowledged that a plaintiff
might sue an offending corporation instead of the employee, but sen-
sibly responded that if such an employer faced liability it would be
motivated to prevent its employees from acting unlawfully. is
The Malesko court also addressed the concern that judgments for
violations of constitutional rights by private entities would affect the
Treasury because the costs would ultimately be passed on to the gov-
120 Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 4080 (JSM), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11403, at *3
(S.D.N.Y.July 28, 1999) (citing Boyle v. United Tech., 487 U.S. 500, 505-09 (1988)).
121 See Malesko, 229 F.3d at 381.
122 Id. at 378.
123 Id. at 379 (quoting Kauffman v. Anglo-American Sch. of Sofia, 28 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C.
Cir. 1994)).
124 Malesko, 229 F.3d at 380.
125 See Cohen v. Empire Blue Cross, 176 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding a private corpora-
tion, not funded by the United States and in which the United States has no proprietary inter-
est, may act as an agent for the government, but is not an institutional arm of the government).
126 See Malesko, 229 F.3d at 380.
127 See id.
128 Id.
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erment.ln The court conceded that the cost of ajudgment might be
passed on to the government but did not find the argument compel-
ling because it did not "believe such liability has the type of direct
impact on federal fiscal policy that the Supreme Court in Meyer was
concerned would result from imposing Bivens liability directly upon
federal agencies."1
In addition, Judge Sotomayor focused on the incongruence of the
Kauffman court's refusal to hold private corporations liable despite
their actions under color of federal law since the Supreme Court, in
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., had clearly held that private corporations
engaging in state action may be held liable under § 1983.131 Since the
courts have treated Bivens and § 1983 actions analogously for most
purposes, she concluded, there is no reason to draw a distinction for
purposes of private corporations. In the context of these cases, the
Supreme Court heard Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.
III. THE SUPREME COURT REFUSES To ALLOW BIVENSACTIONS
AGAINST PRiVATE CONTRACTORS ENGAGING IN STATE ACTION
A. The Majority Opinion in Malesko
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority in Malesko iden-
tifies the authority to imply a constitutional tort as originating from
"our general jurisdiction to decide all cases 'arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States.""32 The Bivens decision
was based in large part on the Court's previous willingness inJ.L Case
v. Borake3 to imply a private right of action from a statute that did not
explicitly grant one. However, Rehnquist notes that the Court had
since "retreated from [its] previous willingness to imply a cause of ac-
tion where Congress has not provided one. '134 Although previously
the Court recognized Bivens claims for violations of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment,'3 the ChiefJustice charac-
terizes these holdings as "refus[ing] to extend Bivens liability to any
new context or new category of defendants."' 37 For example, the
Court in Bush v. Lucas"" denied a federal employee a Bivens remedy
12 See id.
Uo Id.
131 See id. at 381 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982)).
132 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 122 S. Ct. 515, 519 (2001) (referring to 28 U.S.C. §1331).
13 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
14 Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 519 n.3.
i Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
1' Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
137 Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 520.
'3 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
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against government officials for First Amendment violations, despite
the fact that the plaintiff was not able to fully vindicate his constitu-
tional rights and received only reinstatement and backpay under the
elaborate Civil Service remedial system. Rehnquist notes:
[W]e held that administrative review mechanisms crafted by Congress
provided meaningful redress and thereby foreclosed the need to fashion
a new, judicially crafted cause of action .... We further recognized Con-
gress' institutional competence in crafting appropriate relief for ag-
grieved federal employees as a "special factor counseling hesitation in the
creation of a new remedy."
139
Chief Justice Rehnquist also cites Schweiker v. Chilicky as support
for the Court's reluctance to extend Bivens to new contexts: "So long
as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock principles of
separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substan-
tive liability."1  Rehnquist then cites Meyer for the proposition that
the Court refused to allow Bivens actions against federal agencies be-
cause Bivens is meant to deter the officer, not the agency. 1 If plain-
tiffs could get more damages from agencies and therefore decide not
to sue individual officers, the deterrent force of Bivens would be lost.
In Meyer, the Court also found that the potential for large govern-
ment liability constituted a special factor counseling hesitation. As
the Court has been so unwilling to expand Bivens liability in cases like
Meyer, Rehnquist reasons, the Court must refuse to extend it here.
In addition to the Court's general refusals to build on the Bivens
doctrine, Rehnquist states that extending Bivens here would not be
consistent with its purpose:
The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from commit-
ting constitutional violations. Meyer made clear that the threat of litiga-
tion and liability will adequately deter federal officers for Bivens purposes
no matter that they may enjoy qualified immunity .... Meyer also made
clear that the threat of suit against an individual's employer was not the
kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens.14
Similarly, with a corporate defendant, "claimants will focus their col-
lection efforts on it, and not on the individual directly responsible for
the alleged injury."43 Following Meye's logic, Rehnquist concludes, a
Bivens cause of action against a private contractor cannot be implied.
Rehnquist rejects Malesko's argument that implying a suit against
a private corporation would serve the deterrence rationale because
corporations respond to market pressures and do not take constitu-
tional violations into consideration. If private corporations are held
13 Malesko, 122 S. Ct at 520 (citing Bush, 462 U.S. at 380).
140 Id. at 520 (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988)).
141 Id. at 520-21.
14 Id. at 521.
143Id
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liable, they will be deterred from committing constitutional viola-
tions. While Rehnquist recognizes that this may be true, he con-
cludes that "it has no relevance to Bivens, which is concerned solely
with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers. If de-
terring the conduct of a policy-making entity was the purpose of Bi-
vens, then Meyer would have implied a damages remedy against the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."1
The creation of a Bivens cause of action against private contractors
is also foreclosed, Rehnquist reasons, because it would create a dis-
crepancy between the rights of federal prisoners housed in official
Bureau of Prisons facilities and those housed in private facilities. 14 If
the Court held for Malesko, prisoners in traditional facilities could
not sue the government because of sovereign immunity, whereas
those housed at contractor sites could sue the contractors. Only
Congress can decide whether to impose "asymmetrical" costs on pri-
vate contractors but not on the government.
Another factor, according to the majority, was that Malesko had
other effective remedies, namely state tort actions.147 Although "for
Bivens it [was] damages or nothing," Malesko did not face the same
dilemma. Webster Bivens' state claims for intentional tort could be
defeated if he had allowed the officers entrance to his home and, as
the Bivens Court pointed out, citizens are not likely to refuse govern-
ment officers access to their homes. In contrast, Malesko had origi-
nally pleaded a claim of negligence, which would not require a show-
ing similar to that of Bivens. As a result, Malesko's state tort action
would not be foreclosed and, according to the majority, a constitu-
tional tort remedy is not necessary.
B. Justice Stevens'Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argues that the Court may have re-
fused to extend the Bivens remedy to "every conceivable" situation, as
evidenced by Meyer, Bush, Chappel, and Chilicky, but had never "quali-
fied [its] holding that Eighth Amendment violations are actionable
under Bivens.... Nor [has it] ever suggested that a category of fed-
eral agents can commit Eighth Amendment violations with impu-
nity."" Here, Stevens reasons, the Court was only asked to determine
whether certain classes of federal agents should be held liable under
the Constitution, not whether Bivens should be dramatically ex-
4 Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
4 Id.
146 Id
14 Id at 522-23.
4 Id. at 524 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
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panded. Meyer does not support the Malesko holding because Meyer
only differentiated between federal agents and an agency of the
United States. Agencies of the United States are more like the sover-
eign than federal agents and agency liability could subject the federal
government to enormous damages judgments.1 Furthermore, Meyer
claimed a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
while the Court had acknowledged a Bivens action may not always be
appropriate under the Due Process Clause.' 5° In contrast, "[t]he
Court incorrectly assumes that we are being asked 'to imply a new
constitutional tort' .... The tort here is, however, well established;
the only question is whether a remedy in damages is available against
a limited class of tortfeasors."' 51
Stevens begins his assault on the majority by challenging its con-
tention that because plaintiffs have alternative remedies, Bivens ac-
tions should not be available against private contractors. In fact,
Stevens points out, although Bivens may not have had an action
against the federal government under state tort law, he might well
have had a claim against the officer himself under state tort law.
Similarly, in Carlson the Court allowed liability even though the plain-
tiffs had recourse under the Federal Tort Claims Act.152 In relying on
alternative remedies, not only will the Court undermine the uniform-
ity of federal law but it will chip away at the "protection of the full
scope of constitutional rights. '' 3 Although state tort law may have
parallel causes of action to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment, causes of action that mimic the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses may not exist under state tort
law.
15
Stevens then takes issue with the majority's contention that allow-
ing a cause of action against federal actors will not serve the deterrent
goals of Bivens. As previously recognized by the Court in Richardson, 5
private prisons are subject to market pressure, unlike government
prisons, and therefore the private contractor is distinguishable from
the federal agency.
Stevens also points to the incongruity of denying relief against
federal contractors. Instead of producing asymmetry in litigation, as
the majority contends, federal contractor liability would mean that
prisoners in both government and private facilities would be pre-
cluded from suing the government, but instead would be able to sue
149 Id at 524-25.
150 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 n.9. (1994).
151 Malesko, 122 S. Ct. 515, 525 n.5 (StevensJ, dissenting).
152 Id at 526.
3 Id.
154 Id.
15 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997); see infra Part IV.D.
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the primary federal agent-the government agent or the corporation
acting as agent.'6 Indeed, under Malesko, an asymmetry will be pro-
duced between state prisoners housed in private facilities who can sue
the contractors and federal prisoners housed in private facilities who
cannot sue the private corporation.'57 Stevens acknowledges that the
Court has never expressly stated that Bivens and § 1983 should be in-
terchangeable, but there are "sound jurisprudential reasons for paral-
lelism, as different standards for claims against state and federal ac-
tors 'would be incongruous and confusing."' 1 " Indeed, even Meyer
served that parallelism since a § 1983 claimant would not be able to
bring suit against a state agency, as the federal agency could not be
sued.
Finally, Stevens voices his concern that the majority is merely ex-
pressing its opposition to Bivens by holding to its most conservative
interpretation. According to Justice Stevens, the Court should not be
swayed in its adjudication of an individual case by its "predisposition"
for several reasons. 159 First, Congress has never sought to outlaw the
Bivens remedy and has therefore effectively ratified it. Second:
[A] rule that has been such a well-recognized part of our law for over 30
years should be accorded full respect by the Members of this Court,
whether or not they would have endorsed that rule when it was first an-
nounced. For our primary duty is to apply and enforce settled law, not to
revise that law to accord with our own notions of sound policy.160
C. Analysis ofMalesko
Admittedly, the Bivens premise that authority to create federal
common law can be inferred from the federal question statute' 61 is
subject to challenge. After all, diversity jurisdiction does not grant
the courts sufficient power to fashion federal common law, at least
since the demise of Swift v. Tyson162 However, it is arguable that Bi-
vens' strength stems from its ability to enforce constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court said in United States v. Standard Oil Co.:tm
We would not deny the Government's basic premise of the law's capacity
for growth, or that it must include the creative work ofjudges .... But in
the federal scheme our part in that work, and the part of the other fed-
eral courts, outside the constitutional area is more modest than that of state
1M Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 527 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
157 Id. at 527 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37).
158 Id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978)).
11 Id. at 527-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160 I. at528.
161 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993).
16 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overrued by Erie RR. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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courts, particularly in the freedom to create new common-law liabilities,
as Erie]?. Co. v. Tompkins itself witnesses.'m
Whereas Standard Oil precluded the recognition of a right of action
by the United States for the loss of a soldier's services, it specifically
stated that the prohibition on creating new causes of action is limited
to non-constitutional situations. Of course, critics might argue that
Standard Oil must be construed to limit the power to create new sub-
stantive constitutional rights, such as the right recognized in Shaw v.
Reno, rather than the creation of a cause of action. However, rec-
ognizing a Bivens cause of action is essentially the recognition of a
substantive constitutional right and therefore should be allowed un-
der the Standard Oil analysis.
The Malesko opinion is vulnerable to challenge on other grounds.
First, although the ChiefJustice may be correct that the Court has re-
treated from its former willingness to imply rights of action from stat-
utes that do not explicitly create those rights, that does not automati-
cally signify that the Court should be equally unwilling to recognize
constitutional causes of action. Whereas it can be argued that already
existing statutes without explicit private causes of action represent
Congress' wish that no private cause of action exist, the Bivens opin-
ion has shown Congress that statutory authority is not necessary for
private constitutional causes of action. Of course, Malesko could gal-
vanize the legislative branch to enact a statutory cause of action
against federal contractors, but the question remains whether con-
gressional action is truly necessary when constitutional claims are at
stake. Bivens can be seen as advancing the idea that constitutional
rights are so important that statutory authorization for their en-
forcement is unnecessary.
Second, although Chief Justice Rehnquist cites Bush v. Lucas and
Schweiker v. Chilicky for the proposition that the Court has refused to
extend Bivens to new contexts,r6 those cases are distinguishable from
Malesko. In both Bush and Schweiker, the Court did not allow a Bivens
action because Congress had already imposed vast regulations, the
Social Security Act and the Civil Service Commission's Appeal Board
Review.'6 7 In Malesko there was no congressional scheme to provide
an alternative remedy. Instead, Rehnquist relies merely on the avail-
ability of a state law cause of action as rebutting the need for a consti-
tutional cause of action.
l Standard Oi4 332 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
16 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (recognizing an "expressive harm" to citizens of voting districts where
race was the predominant factor in districting).
16 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 122 S. Ct. 515, 520 (2001).
167 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
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Third, the Malesko Court used Meyer to show that Bivens actions are
not available where officers would not be deterred. 16s However,
Harlan's concurrence in Bivens does not support this argument:
I agree with the Court that the appropriateness of according Bivens
compensatory relief does not turn simply on the deterrent effect liability
will have on federal official conduct. Damages as a traditional form of
compensation for invasion of a legally protected interest may be entirely
appropriate even if no substantial deterrent effects on future official law-
lessness might be thought to result. Bivens, after all, has invoked judicial
processes claiming entitlement to compensation for injuries resulting
from allegedly lawless official behavior, if those injuries are properly
compensable in money damages. I do not think a court of law-vested with
the power to accord a remedy--should deny him his relief tmply because he cannot
show that future lawless conduct will thereby be deterred
The Malesko majority ignores Harlan's statements, which suggest that
the purpose of Bivens is not mere deterrence, but the recognition of
constitutional causes of action. Instead, the Court disallows the even
stronger deterrent-the training and discipline that would be pro-
vided by employers if they were found proper Bivens defendants-be-
cause it purportedly would not deter the employee. The Malesko Court
characterizes Bivens as solely concerned with deterring the conduct of
individual officers, yet it ignores the fact that the Bivens Court could
only address federal officers' liability because suit against the federal
government was prohibited. Indeed, the federal government, like
the state governments, is immune from suit, unlike other entities.
Granting federal contractors what is essentially the equivalent of sov-
ereign immunity is questionable logic. Furthermore, Rehnquist's as-
sertion that Meyer precludes creation of a remedy against federal con-
tractors is weakened by the fact that Meyer was also specifically
premised on the notion that impact on the Federal Treasury consti-
tuted a special factor counseling hesitation.'70 Here, there is no indi-
cation that the liability of private contractors will impact the Federal
Treasury.
Fourth, the argument that to create liability against federal con-
tractors, and not the Bureau of Prisons, would foment asymmetry is
not convincing. Asymmetrical costs are imposed on private state con-
tractors, who can be held liable for constitutional violations, whereas
the state government cannot be subject to liability as a result of the
Eleventh Amendment.
Rehnquist's final argument that Malesko has other effective state
tort remedies is successfully refuted by Justice Stevens, who points out
16 Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 521.
16 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407-08
(Harlan,J., concurring) (emphasis added).
1-0 SeeFDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,486 (1994).
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that Bivens may have had state law tort remedies against the federal
officer in his personal capacity.17' This raises the larger question of
whether violations of the Constitution require judicially-created
causes of action, regardless of the availability of state law remedies, in
order to ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and the Su-
premacy Clause.2
These arguments are better understood in the larger context of
Bivens and § 1983 doctrine. The following Section explains the rela-
tion between these causes of actions and proposes that to ensure
comparable treatment for constitutional violations, private contrac-
tors engaging in federal action should be liable under Bivens.
IV. THE PARALLEL NATURE OF BIVENSACTIONS AND § 1983 ACTIONS IN
PROVIDING RELIEF FOR VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Cross-Over Between Immunity Defenses in Bivens
and § 1983 Actions
The cause of action for vindicating constitutional rights depends
on what type of actor has violated those rights-state or federal. Sec-
tion 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code has traditionally been
used against those who have acted under color of state law; actors
must wield a badge of power provided by the state.' 3 As a result of
the § 1983 requirement that actors have acted under color of state
law, suits for violations of constitutional rights by federal agents cannot
be brought under § 1983, but must be brought under Bivens. It is
generally recognized that § 1983 provides a damages remedy against
state and local violators of constitutional rights and that "Bivens cre-
ates a parallel claim against federal defendants."
The rationale for offering parallel remedies to victims of constitu-
tional violations by federal actors, as well as state actors, is found in
the interpretation of immunity and damages jurisprudence. The Su-
preme Court specifically addressed the issue of the interchangeability
of § 1983 immunity law with Bivens jurisprudence in Butz v. Econo-
175mou:
[W] ithout congressional directions to the contrary, we deem it untenable
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought
against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the
171 Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 525-26.
" U.S. CONST. art. VI.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding police officers personally liable under
§ 1983 for violations of arrestee's constitutional rights, despite the fact that arrest without prob-
able cause violated state law).
174 Jeffries, supra note 34, at 89.
M 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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Constitution against federal officials .... To create a system in which the
Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it
does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its
head.
176
A system that monitors the actions of private corporations engaging
in state action more closely than those acting under color of federal
law should be subject to the same criticism. The Supreme Court re-
fused to distinguish between § 1983 and Bivens based on § 1983's
statutory origins:
[T]he Government's analysis would place undue emphasis on the con-
gressional origins of the cause of action in determining the level of im-
munity. It has been observed more than once that the law of privilege as
a defense to damages actions aainst officers of Government has "in large
part been ofjudicial making.
"
l
Despite the lack of reference in § 1983 to immunities, the Court has
consistently interpreted and announced immunities from § 1983 li-
abilitylas The Court also noted in Butz, "The federal courts are
equally competent to determine the appropriate level of immunity
where the suit is a direct claim under the Federal Constitution against
a federal officer."1 " If the federal courts can determine the level of
immunity from a Bivens suit, surely they can determine whether a
federal contractor is liable to suit under Bivens, as they have specifi-
cally addressed that issue in reference to § 1983.
B. Cross-Over Between the Availability of Damages in Bivens and
§ 1983 Actions
The law governing damages also suggests that § 1983 and Bivens
remedies should mimic one another. The Court has recognized a
need for consistency in assigning remedies:
[I]n Carlson v. Green, we stated that punitive damages would be available
in an action against federal officials directly under the Eighth Amend-
ment, partly on the reasoning that since such damages are available un-
der § 1983, it would be anomalous to allow punitive awards against state
officers but not federal ones.
The willingness of the Court to allow cross-pollination between the
causes of action supports the possibility of a federal action against
government contractors, where one is allowed at the state level.
176 Butz, 438 U.S. at 504.
177 Id. at 501-02 (citation omitted).
17 See id. at 502-03 (noting that the Court has announced what it has deemed the appropri-
ate type of immunity from § 1983 in a variety of contexts).
Id. at 503.
IS0 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 36 n.5 (1983) (citation omitted).
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C. Development of§ 1983
Although Bivens and § 1983 have parallel applications, the Bivens
cause of action originated a full one hundred years after the creation
of the statutory right of action in § 1983. To explain why a Bivens ac-
tion should exist where a § 1983 action exists, a short history of the
development of § 1983 is necessary.
Congress adopted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871-now codified as
42 U.S.C. § 1983-in response to white southerners' continued resis-
tance to emancipation and Reconstruction. 18' The statute provides
for a cause of action against any person acting under color of law who
deprives an individual of rights, privileges or immunities guaranteed
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.ss Section 1983 lay
dormant until 1961-nearly a century after its passage-when the
Supreme Court held that individual police officers could be held per-
sonally liable under § 1983 for violations of rights secured by the
Constitution.ss Over a vigorous dissent by Justice Frankfurter, the
Court held that individual officers could be held liable, regardless of
the availability of a state law remedy, and despite the fact that the of-
ficer may have violated established state law. The Bivens cause of
action against federal agents mimics that provided by § 1983 against
state agents.
1. Municipalities Are Held Liable Under § 1983
Section 1983 gained even more power in 1978 when the Supreme
Court, in Monell v. Department of Social Services, ruled that municipali-
ties were "persons" for purposes of § 1983 and could therefore be
18 In Monroe v. Pape, the Court discussed the history of the Act
This Act of April 20, 1871 ... was passed by a Congress that had the Klan "particularly in
mind." The debates are replete with references to the lawless conditions existing in the
South in 1871 .... It was not the unavailability of state remedies but the failure of cer-
tain States to enforce laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful momentum
behind this "force bill."
365 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1961) (internal citation omitted).
182 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
18 SeeMonroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
184 The Monroe Court explained:
It was argued there, as it is here, that "under color of" state law included only action
taken by officials pursuant to state law. We rejected that view .... We conclude that the
meaning given "under color of" law in the Classic case and in the Screws and Williams
cases was the correct one; and we adhere to it.
Id. at 184-87 (internal citation omitted).
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sued for the violations of rights secured by the Constitution.'5 Al-
though Monell opened the door to a class of previously barred law-
suits, its force was blunted by the requirement that the violation have
resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality.'1t  In effect,
municipalities are not liable on a respondeat superior basis for the
actions of its employees.' Nevertheless, the strength of § 1983 is un-
deniable and has been decried by Justices of the Supreme Court.""
Monell seems particularly pertinent here because Justice Bren-
nan's decision to hold municipalities liable, and reject their claims of
Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity, rested on the simi-
larities between corporations and municipalities. "[B]y 1871, it was
well understood that corporations should be treated as natural per-
sons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analy-
sis." ' s9 As early as 1869, the Letson principle1'9 was "automatically and
without discussion extended to municipal corporations."19' As a result,
[C] ounties, cities and corporations of all sorts, after years ofjudicial con-
flict, have become thoroughly established to be an individual or person
or entity of the personal existence, of which, as a citizen, individual, or
inhabitant, the United States Constitution does take note and endow with
faculty to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States.
l
9
Although a county engages in state action, it is not protected from
suit by the Eleventh Amendment.19 3 Given that municipalities are
held liable because of their likeness to corporations (albeit those en-
gaged in state action), it would follow that corporations engaged in
federal action should be subject to the parallel federal cause of action
for violations of constitutional rights. The extension of the Bivens
claim to private corporations, however, would necessarily require that
183 Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
18 See id at 692 ("The ... language plainly imposes liability on a government that, under
color of some official policy, 'causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights.").
1s7 The Monell majority concluded:
[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to rep-
resent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983.
Id. at 694.
183 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Monroe
changed a statute that had generated only 21 cases in the first 50 years of its existence into one
that pours into the federal courts tens of thousands of suits each year, and engages this Court in
a losing struggle to prevent the Constitution from degenerating into a general tort law.").
189 Moneg4 436 U.S. at 687.
190 See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston IR. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844)
(holding that a corporation is as liable as a "natural" person for purposes of suit).
191 Mone!l 436 U.S at 688 (emphasis added).
192 Id at 688 n.50 (quoting Globe 752 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger)).
193 Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S 651, 667 n.12 (1974) (citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U.S. 529 (1890)).
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those corporations benefit from the Monell policy requirement, oth-
erwise the new cause of action would not be parallel to the § 1983
cause of action.
Indeed, the extension of the Monell policy requirement to the Bi-
vens cause of action is evident in the Hammons court's requirements:
"If it can be shown that the corporate policy at issue has violated
Hammons' constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment, and
that the policy is attributable to the federal government, Hammons is
entitled to relief."94
2. The Strength of § 1983 Is Undercut by Eleventh
Amendment Immunity
Despite § 1983's ability to reach individual officers, municipalities,
and school boards, state liability presents a greater hurdle. State
prisoners may sue state corrections officers personally under § 1983
for both compensatory and punitive damages; however, these suits of-
ten yield little monetary relief.'9 5 Juries may react poorly to inmates
and undercompensate plaintiffs with strong suits against individual
officers.19 The possibility of insufficient compensation in suits
against individual officers and the search for "deep pockets" has led
plaintiffs away from suits against individual officers. 9 These risks also
explain the interest in the liability of private contractors.
Although a prospective plaintiff might think of the state as a po-
tential remunerator, state prisoners in state-run facilities are barred
from suing the offending state for monetary damages by the Eleventh
Amendment.'9 Although the language of the Eleventh Amendment
indicates that states can invoke immunity from suits by citizens of
other states and foreign citizens, the Supreme Court has interpreted
194 Hammons v. Norfolk S. Corp., 156 F.3d 701, 708 (6th Cir. 1998).
19 One commentator has argued:
Governmental (municipal) liability in a section 1983 action is significant for a number of
reasons. First, it provides a deep pocket. This is important not only so that there will be
funds to pay off a successful plaintiff but because it also likely creates more successful
plaintiffs by alleviating the reluctance of judges and juries to hold an individual em-
ployee liable for carrying out his governmental duties.
Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337, 363
(1989).
1% See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 33 (1983) (awarding $25,000 in compensatory and
$5,000 in punitive damages for an inmate who was assaulted and raped in jail).
197 See Rosen, supra note 195. But see Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange
Results of Public Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65 (1999) (arguing that as
a result of governmental indemnification, individuals are not in practice liable under Bivens).
198 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State").
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the immunity to extend to suits by citizens against their own states. 199
In lieu of damages, plaintiffs alleging violations of rights secured by
the Constitution may only seek injunctive relief by suing the respon-
sible state official in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young °
fiction. The Ex parte Young principle draws on the common law tradi-
tion that "the king can do no wrong."2m ' Therefore, if a state official
violates the Constitution he is no longer acting under the protection
of the state and may therefore be enjoined from engaging in the ille-
gal conduct-hence the characterization of the holding as a fiction.n
State sovereign immunity is a parallel concept to that of federal
sovereign immunity, which Justice Thomas has characterized as the
rationale behind the creation of Bivens liability. As Justice Harlan
noted in his Bivens concurrence, "However desirable a direct remedy
against the Government might be as a substitute for individual officer
liability, the sovereign still remains immune to suit.''2°3  Although
some commentators contend that the jurisprudence of federal sover-
eign immunity was not sufficiently developed to provide a basis for
denying direct federal liability,2 besides asserting federal sovereign
immunity in Bivens, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
immunity of the federal government.2" Once again, the jurispru-
dence of sovereignty in the state and federal areas mimic one an-
other, despite the seeming incongruence of the liability of munici-
palities, which the Supjreme Court held are not states for Eleventh
Amendment purposes.
19 SeeHansv. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
MD 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20] Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) ("The generation that designed and adopted
our federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity. When
the Constitution was ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown could not be
sued without consent in its own courts.").
See Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
2M Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan,J., concurring).
2H Criticizing the Courts' reasoning in Bivens, Rosen writes:
[T]he Court ruled, without discussion, that the damages to which the victim was entitled
could be garnered only from the individual federal officer who committed the violation.
Although nowhere mentioned in the majority opinion, the Court apparently assumed
that the United States had sovereign immunity from a claim for damages based upon the
Constitution.
Rosen, supra note 195, at 341.
2o See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 709 ("[B]ecause the Federal Government retains its
own immunity from suit in state and federal court, this Court is reluctant to conclude that
States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege.").
See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 ("Our holding today is, of course,
limited to local governments units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh
Amendment purposes.").
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D. A Wrinkle in the Parallelism Between the § 1983 Liability of State
Employees and Private Employees
In 1997, the Supreme Court held that prison guards, employed by
private prisons that have contracted with the state, cannot claim
qualified immunity when they are sued under § 1983.2 Justice
Breyer examined the common law when § 1983 was enacted in 1871
and found that private prison operators did not enjoy such immu-
nity.m In addition, "the most important special government immu-
nity-producing concern-unwarranted timidity-is less likely pres-
ent... when a private company subject to competitive market
pressures operates a prison." In contrast, Justice Scalia stressed the
need to adhere to a functionalist approach-an approach which
grants immunities based on the function of the actor.0° Hence, the
private prison guard should be treated as a public prison guard since
that is his function. Indeed, a Justice at the Malesko oral argument
posited that McKnight had specifically rejected parallelism.
Richardson did not reject parallelism so much as it rejected strict
functionalism. If the Malesko Court had adhered to the strict func-
tionalist argument, the private prison corporation would not be liable
as would be performing the same function as the state would per-
form. This approach would deny the importance of the Eleventh
Amendment doctrine, which approves immunity only for the state
and arms of the state, precisely because the state is sovereign and
should not be impugned in court without its consent. Nowhere has
Eleventh Amendment doctrine hinted that its protection can be en-
joyed by a private corporation that merely engages in state action.
The power of the Eleventh Amendment lies precisely and solely be-
cause the state is sovereign.
E. The State Action Doctrine
Private entities that have won contracts with the states may also be
sued by prisoners for violations of rights secured by the Constitution
pursuant to § 1983, assuming there is state action 212 and the entity is
not an "arm of the state" and thereby imbued with Eleventh Amend-
20 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
2 See id. at 404.
2W Id. at 409.
210 See i&L at 416 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
211 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, No. 00-860, 2001 WL
1182728, at *36 (Oct. 1, 2001) ("We rejected parallelism in Richardson. Parallelism--symmetry
is very difficult to achieve in this area as of this point, no matter what we do.").
212 SeeWest v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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ment sovereign immunity.213 The state action requirement was first
articulated in The Civil Rights Cases, where the Supreme Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment only protected against state "aggres-
214sion," not violations of rights by private parties. As a result, the Su-
preme Court has developed a body of law that requires a state to be
involved with an alleged violation of rights protected by the Constitu-
tion.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the state action doctrine
provides strong support for the extension of liability to private con-
tractors that engage in federal action. The Second 1 and Sixth2 16 Cir-
cuits' assertions that corporations engaging in federal action should
be liable, as are those engaging in state action, rely primarily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.21 7 In Lugar,
the respondent sought a prejudgment attachment of the petitioner's
property in Virginia state court on the belief that he might attempt to
dispose of his property in order to defeat his creditors. The clerk of
the court reviewed the ex parte petition and issued an attachment,
which was executed by the Sheriff.218 The trial court, however, dis-
missed the attachment for Edmondson's failure to establish the statu-
tory grounds for attachment. Lugar subsequently brought suit under
§ 1983, not against the Sheriff, but against Edmondson for a violation
of his rights protected by the Due Process Clause. '9 Justice White,
speaking for the Court, held that a private party's joint participation
with state officials in the seizure of disputed property was enough to
confer state actor status on the private party.an Consequently,
Edmondson-a private corporation-was held liable for the violation
of Lugar's rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Another Supreme Court holding, West v. Atkins,e22 addresses the li-
ability of contractors of prison services even more directly. Inmate
Quincy West brought suit against a private physician under § 1983 al-
leging the doctor violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment when he refused to schedule
surgery to repair West's torn Achilles tendon.2 The physician was
213 See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994) (holding that bi-state rail-
way does not enjoy "arm of the state" status or Eleventh Amendment immunity as the state
treasury was not at risk).
214 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
215 See Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2000).
216 See Hammons v. Norfolk S. Corp., 156 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1998).
217 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
218 SeeLugarv. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924-25.
219 See id. at 925.
= Id. at 941.
22 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
Zn West, 487 U.S. at 44.
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under contract with North Carolina to provide orthopedic services at
a state prison hospital, and West was barred by state law from seeking
a physician of his own choosing.2 Justice Blackmun delivered the
opinion of the Court and held that the physician's action was fairly
attributable to the State precisely because the State employed him. 2 4
Justice Blackmun distinguished Polk County v. Dodson,2 which held
that a public defender was not engaged in state action, by contrasting
the adversarial relationship between the pubic defender and the State
with the cooperative relationship between the doctor and the State.
"In contrast to the public defender, Doctor Atkins' professional and
ethical obligation to make independent medical judgments did not
set him in conflict with the State and other prison authorities.2 6 Be-
cause it has been established that states have a constitutional obliga-
tion under the Eighth Amendment to provide adequate medical care
to inmates,27 the Court refused to allow North Carolina to contract
out of its constitutional obligations.
Most important in the state action requirement relating to prison-
ers is the "public function test." Under this test, a private party acts
under color of law when it performs a function or power "tradition-
ally exclusively reserved to the State." One district court has noted,
"In the context of privately run prisons, courts have applied the pub-
lic function test and found that private contractors who run pgrisons
have acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983."22 The
Sixth Circuit held that a private corporation that incarcerated in-
mates was acting under color of state law. ° A Florida district court
held a private contractor that had contracted to run a Florida county
jail was a state actor for purposes of § 1983.231 In NewJersey, a district
court ruled that "if a state contracted with a private corporation to
run its prisons it would no doubt subject the privateprison employees
to § 1983 suits under the public function doctrine."
24 Id. at 56.
M 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
26 West, 487 U.S. at 51.
=7 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (holding that the provision of a
utility is not a traditional public function).
2 McCullum v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.98-5858, 1999 WAL 493696, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
July 13, 1999).
20 See Street v. Corr. Corp. ofAm., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996).
231 See Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423, 426-27 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
Plain v. Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898,907 (D.NJ. 1986).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has treated § 1983 and Bivens actions as
analogous in the context of both immunity and damages law. Given
the consistent exchange of remedies and defenses in developing the
applicable law governing constitutional torts, corporate entities en-
gaging in federal action should be liable for constitutional violations
as are their counterparts engaging in state action. The extension of
§ 1983 state action principles to Bivens suits will no doubt increase the
possibility of recovery for Bivens plaintiffs and serve the original pur-
pose of Bivens, which, in the words of the distinguished Justice
Harlan,23 was the remedy of constitutional violations.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398-
411 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring).
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